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Abstract: The article aims to assess a change in the EU’s soft power in the 
Western Balkan and Eastern Partnership states in the light of the 
crises the bloc has undergone in recent years. Generally agreeing 
with the common argument that the EU’s attractiveness for those 
countries has decreased, the author challenges the popular wisdom 
that such a decrease is likely to reverse those states’ pro-EU foreign 
policy orientations. To prove it, the author applies Joseph Nye’s and 
Alexander Vuving’s “power currencies” approach to operationalize 
soft power, considering the bloc’s attraction as a combination of 
“brilliance” (the actor’s relationship with its work), “benignity” 
(the actor’s relationship with other actors) and “beauty” (the 
actor’s relationship with values and ideas). Elaborating on the 
crises’ influence on each of these currencies, the author shows that 
their lessening, first, has mainly taken place in absolute rather than 
relative terms, so the EU’s attractiveness remains strong compared 
to that of its competitors, and second, it has primarily affected the 
bloc’s soft power potential rather than its actual behavior towards 
the target countries.
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1. Introduction
 
Traditionally, the EU, “an economic giant and political dwarf” was considered 
as an international actor possessing significant “soft power”, that is, having 
considerable “ability to get what you want by attraction rather than coercion or 
payment” (Nye, 2004, p. x). Specifically in the case of the EU, soft power takes 
the forms of “normative” (Manners, 2002) and “civilian power” (Telò, 2007), 
both of which imply the bloc’s non-coercive influence over other IR actors owing 
to the attractiveness of different aspects of its developmental model for them.1 
The usefulness of soft power for the EU arguably lies not only in foreign but 
also in domestic policy: to exemplify, it has been argued that discourse on soft 
power can aid the EU in handling its “capability-expectations gap” (Tulmets, 
2007) and facilitate building a stronger European identity (Michalski, 2005).
In recent years, however, the EU has been undergoing several consecutive 
challenges which, some argue, have led to a decline in the bloc’s soft power. 
To name a few, the EU has experienced the 2011 eurozone crisis, the 2015 
Greek government-debt and refugee crises, the 2016 Brexit—to say nothing of 
systemic crises that can hardly be located chronologically, such as the North–
South divide and a rise of far-left, far-right parties and populist regimes. The 
soft power decline is argued to especially apply to Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
members and Western Balkans states, which are all engaged in certain forms of 
formal rapprochement with the EU: the former (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) 
have signed EU Association Agreements, whereas the latter are either official 
candidates to accession (Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) 
or are on the way to obtaining its status (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo).2 
In particular, Müller (2016, pp. 363–364) and Smith (2014, p. 106) contend 
that the EU tends to turn its attention to its internal economic and financial 
matters at the expense of foreign policy goals. Sadowski (2013, pp. 41–43) 
argues that the crises result in both the EU’s and the target states’ businesses 
getting less interested in one another, which might eventually reverse their elites’ 
1 Following Nielsen (2016, pp. 8–9), I find the concept ‘soft power’ more preferable 
to ‘civilian’ or ‘normative’ power, since, first, it is a more widespread concept in the 
world IR scholarship (the other two are rather EU-contextual) and second, it enables 
to more fully take account of various dimensions of an IR actor’s attractiveness for 
other actors.
2 Hereinafter, I will refer to the mentioned states as ‘target states’ or ‘target countries’. I 
intentionally exclude two EP members—Belarus and Azerbaijan—from further anal-
ysis, because they stand out in their political regimes and geopolitical orientations: 
unlike the other target states, Belarus and Azerbaijan remain highly authoritarian and 
have never expressed interest in concluding an EU Association Agreement.
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commitments to mutual rapprochement. He also notes that a widening split on 
internal political issues among EU Member States leads to the bloc’s relations 
with its neighbors in general and its enlargement in particular being of lower 
relevance, which slows down the pace of integration and, in turn, negatively 
affects the target countries’ determination to align with the EU (Sadowski, 2013, 
pp. 43–44). 
Furthermore, researchers express certain fears that the EU’s weakening soft 
power may turn out to be unable to compete against Russia’s hard power 
influence, its use of coercion and pressure on the target countries (Sadowski, 
2013, pp. 44–46). IR students also have pointed out a relative decline of the EU’s 
against the backdrop of US soft power that improved under President Obama 
(Smith, 2014, p. 106), as well as the EU’s inconsistency in its promotion of 
values, which manifests itself in “support for authoritarian regimes in the name 
of stability” (Smith, 2014, p. 107). Finally, scholars argue that an organization 
facing one crisis after another no longer poses an attractive model to follow and, 
hence, cannot teach its neighbors how to live any more, which brings about the 
need to search for a different approach to the target countries (Popescu, 2011). 
This article, however, aims to partially specify and partially challenge these 
speculations. Not doubting that the crises have diminished the EU’s attractiveness 
in general, I argue that such speculations primarily rest on the exaggeration 
of the effect of the crises on EU soft power. I contend that the diminution of 
the bloc’s attractiveness in the target states, first, has mostly influenced its soft 
power assets rather than real behavior toward the target countries and second, 
has mainly taken place in absolute, rather than relative terms and, hence, is 
unlikely to entail any significant reverse of those countries’ pro-EU orientations. 
Methodologically, this article is built upon three core premises. First, I account 
for the fact that both groups of states have been arenas of Russia–EU geopolitical 
competition (see Rostoks, 2015; Żornaczuk, 2016) and in consequence, face 
a so-called “civilizational choice” between the two actors. The presence of 
the agent’s (in this case, the EU’s) competitor (Russia) is likely to impact the 
former’s attractiveness as perceived by the subject (in this case, the target states) 
and, thus, influence the latter’s foreign policy choices (for details, see Patalakh, 
2016, pp. 100–103). Second, I apply a subject-centred rather than agent-centred 
approach to soft power analysis, that is, I focus on the EU’s characteristics of 
which the target states may conceive as attractive (for other studies employing 
a similar approach, see Rohrbacher & Jeníčková, 2011; Rostoks, 2015), rather 
than considering soft power not as an intentional strategy led by the agent to 
attract the subject, like most studies do (e.g., Nye, 2004; Michalski, 2005; 
Patalakh, 2016).
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 11/11/17 9:38 AM
151
EU Soft Power in the Eastern Neighborhood 
and the Western Balkans in the Context of Crises
Baltic Journal of European Studies
Tallinn University of Technology (ISSN 2228-0588), Vol. 7, No. 2 (23)
Third, I operationalize soft power around three so-called “power currencies”—
benignity, brilliance and beauty—that, according to Alexander Vuving (2009, 
pp. 8–12) and Joseph Nye (2011, p. 92), constitute different dimensions of 
the agent’s attractiveness for the subject (see Table 1). Brilliance refers to the 
agent’s relationship with its work, which in international relations may manifest 
itself in high living standards, stable economy, successful and effective solution 
of internal problems, etc. Brilliance induces the subject to admire the agent 
and as a result, view the latter as attractive to follow. Benignity pertains to the 
agent’s relationship with other actors and especially with the subject: the agent’s 
generous, kind, supportive behavior toward the subject increases the former’s 
attractiveness via the production of gratitude and sympathy. Finally, beauty 
denotes the agent’s relationship with values and ideas: if the agent actively 
follows and promotes certain ideas that the subject considers as good, the latter 
gets inspired and, again, regards the agent as attractive to align to.3
Table 1. Soft power/attraction “currencies”
Power  
“currency”
Corresponding dimension of 
the agent’s life
Psychological 
mechanism
Foundation in basic human 
tendencies
Brilliance The agent’s relations  with its work
First admiration, 
then imitation
Learning from others’ 
 successes
Beauty The agent’s relations with ideas, values and visions Inspiration
Uniting with those having 
similar values/goals; the 
need for moral support and 
aesthetic experience
Benignity
The agent’s relations with other 
actors, particularly with the 
subject of soft power
Gratitude and 
sympathy Reciprocal altruism
Source: Based on Vuving, 2009, pp. 8–12
3 Remarkably, this classification of attractiveness into three types from the subject’s 
perspective should not be viewed as a cursory theory: in fact, it matches a long 
tradition in psychology that discriminates three categories of human mind, that is, 
cognition, affection and conation (see Hilgard, 1980), and subsequently, human at-
titudes—into cognitive, affective and conative (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This point 
is mirrored in various areas of social sciences: to cite some examples, Habermas 
(1984) distinguishes between the objective, social and subjective worlds of reality; 
Eisenegger and Imhof (2008) single out the functional, social and expressive kinds 
of reputation; Risse (2000) distinguishes between three logics of social action, to wit, 
logic of arguing, logic of consequentialism and logic of appropriateness.
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2. Impact of crises on EU soft power
2.1 Brilliance
An analysis of EU’s brilliance first necessitates the understanding of the bloc’s 
actions and qualities that are likely to shape other actors’ perception of its 
achievements. Most intuitively, for an integration group to be considered as 
“brilliant”, it should prove itself as having functional institutions and members 
that are able to come to agreements and abide by regulations. Additionally, any 
organization is assessed on the basis of the aims for the pursuance of which it 
exists. According to Article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been established 
to conduce to peace and the economic (internal market, competition, economic 
growth) and social (sustainable development, social progress, full employment, 
environmental protection, well-being) development of its Member States as well 
as their scientific and technical advancement.
Brilliance is evidently the aspect of the EU’s soft power that has been directly 
affected by the crises, due to which the EU has become a less attractive model 
to align to. To name a few consequences, the eurozone crisis exacerbated North-
South disparities in the EU and brought Greece to the brink of renouncing 
the euro in 2015. The inability of the International Coalition in Syria, partly 
comprised of EU member countries, to efficaciously combat ISIS entailed an 
unprecedented influx of refugees to the EU, which, in turn, provoked a rise of 
nationalism inside the bloc, uncovered a wide gap in EU members’ approaches 
to migrants and was one of the causes of Brexit. A series of terrorist attacks 
across the EU in 2015–2017 have also generated debates on the effectiveness 
of the bloc’s refugee policies and border controls in combating terrorism. All in 
all, it does not appear an overstatement to argue that the EU has come out of the 
crises weaker, poorer and less united than before.
However, a broader look at the components of the EU’s brilliance, instead of 
a focus on particular events, leads to doubts regarding the truthfulness of the 
above-mentioned argument that the EU no longer presents an attractive model to 
follow. First, except in the case of Brexit, where the EU’s precedent endeavors 
to negotiate appropriate conditions for the UK to stay in the Union had not 
proven effective, the EU has succeeded in resolving most crises diplomatically, 
via negotiations: the bloc managed to find suitable terms for Greece to stay in 
the eurozone and conclude a deal with Turkey that abated a further influx of 
refugees. Even Brexit, with its definitely negative impact on EU’s economic 
power and international image, is likely to have a positive impact on EU 
integration by strengthening unity among EU Member States and encouraging 
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EU elites to conduct needful reforms (Oliver, 2017). Second, the crises have 
not affected the EU’s position as the region’s most progressive power regarding 
socio-economic standards and indicators. In the Social Progress Index, all the 
target countries rank lower than EU Member States (Porter & Stern, 2016, pp. 
17–18). The same applies to the Human Development, Corruption Perception 
and Environmental Performance Indexes with Montenegro, Georgia and 
Armenia being the sole exceptions correspondingly (UNDP, 2016, pp. 198–
201; Transparency International, 2016; Hsu 2016, pp. 18–19). Third, the crises 
have hardly affected the EU’s position as the region’s most advanced actor 
scientifically and technologically: for instance, the 2016 Times Higher Education 
Index includes hundreds of EU Member States’ universities; concurrently, as 
for the target countries, only one Serbian and two Ukrainian universities are 
present there, and they rank low, from 600 to 800 (Times Higher Education, 
2016). EU members also outrank all the target countries, except Serbia, in ICT 
Development Index (ITU, 2016, p. 12).
Moreover, EU’s brilliance looks even higher against the background of its 
competitors in the region, the most important of which is the Russia-led Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU). Currently made up of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Russia, that organization is considered to be the most promising 
integration project in the post-Soviet space (e.g., Zagorski, 2015). The EAEU’s 
performance to date, however, seems to have only strengthened the relative 
attractiveness of the EU for the target countries. To draw a parallel, despite 
its relative painfulness, the 2011 eurozone crisis was comparatively short and 
turned into an economic growth already in 2013: in fact, Greece was the only EU 
member exhibiting no economic growth in 2015 (Eurostat, 2017). In the EAEU, 
the unprecedented depreciation of the Russian rouble in 2014 entailed a similar 
crisis in its other member states, coupled with the total GDP falling from 2,566,4 
billion dollars in 2013 to 2,375,2 billion in 2014 to 1,581,7 billion dollars in 2015 
(Eurasian Economic Commission, 2016, pp. 18–19). Importantly, economists 
consider it scarcely possible for the rouble to win back its position and for the 
Russian economy—to recover fast and steadily given currently low oil prices 
and unfavorable investment climate (see Movchan, 2017). Furthermore, while 
in the EU, the common market has led to strengthening economic ties between 
its Member States—statistically, since 2009 there has been a constant growth in 
intra-EU trade (Eurostat, 2016)—in the EAEU, the trend over the last five years 
has surprisingly been the opposite, towards a decline in mutual trade (Eurasian 
Economic Commission, 2016, p. 24). 
Additionally, unlike in EU case, membership in the EAEU does not presuppose 
any adherence to particular values. As a result, the union consists of countries 
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that significantly vary in their commitments to democracy, political freedoms, 
and market economy (Roberts & Moshes, 2015). Coupled with the weakness 
of the Eurasian Economic Commission, the bloc’s supranational institution, as 
well as the fact that EAEU members have strong “regime identities”, the lack 
of common values often entails strong difficulties for the bloc when it comes to 
finding a consensus between its member states (Roberts & Moshes, 2015), albeit 
it consists of only five members against the EU’s 28 ones. While EU Member 
States—with difficulties, but still—managed to find a consensus on how to react 
to the Ukrainian crisis, Russia’s EAEU fellows not only refused to officially 
recognize its annexation of Crimea and join its food embargo against the EU, 
but also tried to take advantage of sanctions imposed on Russia: Belarus, for 
example, started to sell EU food to Russia with Belarusian labels, which entailed 
several “trade wars” between the two countries (Roberts & Moshes, 2015). 
Lastly, unlike the EU, the EAEU, to a great extent, rests on hard rather than soft 
power and serves Russia’s goals. Indeed, EAEU members tend to complain that 
its Commission is dominated by Russian officials who pursue Russian interests 
(Daly, 2014). Moreover, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan are argued to have been 
coercively pushed into the bloc and not joined it voluntarily: for instance, one 
of the reasons why Armenia in September 2013 opted for an EAEU membership 
instead of an EU Association Agreement was thatMoscow had threatened Erevan 
with increasing gas prices by 70%, banning Armenian exports and blocking 
private transfers of money to Armenia, deporting Armenians working in Russia 
and providing offensive weaponry to Azerbaijan (for details, see Patalakh, 
2017, pp. 8-9). This all is contrary to the EU which, first, can hardly be blamed 
for coercing other countries to enter it, given how long its candidates have to 
wait until being accepted, and, second, is not dominated by any single country, 
though some of its Member States do have greater influence than others.
2.2 Beauty
Regarding ideas and values, one can single out two main aspects that constitute 
the EU’s attractiveness for the target countries. First, Article 21 of the Lisbon 
Treaty obliges the bloc to promote democracy and human rights which are, 
first, according to surveys, considered important by the majority of Europeans, 
including the citizens of the target countries (Ferrin & Kriesi, 2014, p. 7), 
and second, regarded as universal values internationally: it is no coincidence 
that even the world’s most authoritarian regimes constantly endeavor to 
present themselves as committed to democracy and human rights. For the 
target countries, all of which are on their way towards democracy and rule of 
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law4, the fact that the EU rests upon these values and is one of their foremost 
international promoters (Treaty of Lisbon, Art. 3) is an indicator of the bloc’s 
progressiveness, which makes rapprochement with it prestigious. Second, this 
progressiveness allows the EU to be viewed as contrary to autocracy in general 
and Cold War Communist regimes in particular. It is especially significant for 
such states as Georgia, the foreign policies of which are largely guided by their 
European identities rather than pragmatic cost-benefit calculation (see Kakachia 
& Minesashvili, 2015; Chochia & Popjanevski, 2016).5 Alignment with the 
EU fulfils their aspirations to belong to the Western club of “civilized” states, 
detaching them from their Communist past and contemporary Russia which they 
conceive of as outdated, underdeveloped.
Both aspects appear to be affected by the current crises. First, the crises is one of 
the factors that have triggered a rise of populist movements in the EU (Bröning, 
2016). A number of them, such as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary and Jarosław 
Kaczyński’s Law and Justice in Poland, have utilized anti-EU rhetoric to assume 
power and consolidate their grip on it, swerving from democracy and liberal 
values, while the EU, in turn, has turned out incapable of disciplining its Member 
States for illiberal turns (Halmai, 2017). Second, the crises have affected the 
EU’s image as an opposer to Russia’s autocracy, contributing to the activation 
of so-called Putin’s “Trojan horses” in EU relations with Russia, that is, actors 
inside the bloc that systematically express attitudes and take steps favorable 
for Russia (e.g., oppose imposition of sanctions on Russia, conclude deals with 
4 To date, no target state is deemed authoritarian in international indexes. Democracy 
Index regards Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia as flawed democracies, 
while Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine—as hybrid 
regimes (EIU, 2016, pp. 4–8). Freedom House (2017, pp. 20–24) defines all the target 
states as partly free, except Serbia which is considered free.
5 In principle, for different states, the EU’s attractiveness may be primarily benignity-
driven, beauty-driven, or brilliance-driven, which corresponds to the three possible 
logics of EU legitimation found in the theory, that is, contextual, conceiving of the 
EU as a value-based community, instrumental, deeming the EU as a problem-solving 
entity, or communicative, regarding the EU as a rights-based union (Eriksen & Fos-
sum, 2004, pp. 437–448). Georgia is an illustrative case of the first one, while Serbia, 
whose affiliation with the EU is usually thought of as driven by the utilitarian desire 
to gain material benefits (Economides & Ker-Lindsay, 2015), seems exemplary of 
the second one. Importantly, motives for alignment may alter over time: to illustrate, 
for Ukraine, which traditionally used to pragmatically balance between Russia and 
the EU, a pro-European orientation turned into a comprehensive national idea after 
it suffered Russia’s aggression in March 2014 (Tsybulenko & Pakhomenko, 2016). I 
abstain, however, from strictly subdividing all the target states into three groups by 
the logics of their integration intentions, since, first, relevant case studies are missing 
on some of them and, second, most of them are likely to display a mix of several log-
ics with no single logic strictly prevailing over the others.
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Russia that contradict EU policies, etc.), despite the EU’s common critical 
stance on Putin’s regime for systemic human rights violations and aggression 
in Ukraine (Orenstein & Kelemen, 2017). Putin’s “Trojan horses” in the EU are 
present at the level of Member States, including not only those ruled by populist 
leaders/parties, such as Greece (Tsipras’ Syriza) and Hungary (Orbán’s Fidesz), 
who share Putin’s anti-EU rhetoric, but also liberal states, such as Cyprus and 
Italy, whose pro-Putin moves mostly spring from their close economic ties 
with Russia, which they regard as especially crucial to keep in the period of 
economic problems. Though those “Trojan horses” constitute a minority of EU 
members, the bloc is not always able to overcome their opposition, which tends 
to sap its reputation as a human rights promoter: for example, due to Italy’s 
protest, the EU did not place new sanctions for Russia’s violent bombing of 
Aleppo in October 2016, which was being backed by Germany, France and 
the UK (Emmott & Guarascio, 2016). Also, Russia’s “Trojan horses” include a 
number of far-left and far-right political parties across the EU, such as France’s 
National Front, Italy’s Five Star Movement, etc. (see Laruelle, 2015). Those 
parties are not ruling any Member States, but sometimes have majorities in 
regional parliaments, which tends to make their actions noticeable: for instance, 
in May 2016, the council of the Italian region of Veneto, dominated by the 
far-right Northern League, issued a declaration which recommended the Italian 
government to recognize Crimea as a Russian territory (Murtazina, 2016).
Nonetheless, under close inspection, it becomes clear that the aforementioned 
losses in the EU’s beauty barely surpass its attractive aspects. First of all, despite 
a decline in freedom and democracy in absolute terms, the EU is still relatively 
democratic and free: even the bloc’s illiberal democracies, such as Poland and 
Hungary, rank higher in Democracy Index than any of the target countries 
(EIU, 2016, pp. 4–8). Second, the rising pragmatism concerning human rights 
promotion and relations with Russia seems to play—perhaps, surprisingly—into 
the hands of not only “pragmatic”, but also more identity-driven states which tend 
to drop ideational concerns when it comes to matters of security and economic 
development. In August 2015, for instance, the then Georgian Prime Minister 
Irakli Garibashvili expressed his opposition to his country’s joining sanctions 
against Russia, arguing that such would hinder the normalization of Georgian-
Russian relations (Jones, 2015). In a similar vein, in November 2014, the then 
Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Đukanović, known as a firm supporter of his 
country’s entering the EU and NATO, spoke in favor of lifting the Russia sanctions 
for economic reasons (Prekic, 2014). Third, in fairness to the EU, the aforesaid 
growth of pragmatism in the bloc seems limited and in fact, the union has several 
times proved in practice that it is not ready to sacrifice its fundamental principles 
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for attaining tactical goals: to illustrate, to Ukraine’s satisfaction, the EU never 
lifted its sanctions in return for Russia’s military operation against the Islamic 
State, on which Putin was reportedly counting in autumn 2015 (Bodner, 2015). 
Finally, despite their pro-Russian moves, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, and Italy 
have constantly shown support for the rapprochement of the target countries 
with the EU, which even for the identity-driven states is undoubtedly a matter 
of higher importance. At the same time, the “Trojan horses” among EU 
populist movements, such as the French National Front and the Italian Five-
Star Movement, have continuously opposed accepting new Member States and 
concluding new association agreements. Nevertheless, to date, such movements 
do not significantly impact the bloc’s foreign policy and it is unclear how they 
will act should they win office: one can agree with Tetlock (1981, p. 207) that “it 
is no simple matter to predict how prospective leaders will act once they come 
to power. Upon the triumph of their cause, seemingly fanatical revolutionaries 
sometimes become pragmatic and flexible statesmen”.
2.3 Benignity
Similarly to beauty, the EU’s benignity for the target countries primarily stems 
from two sources. First, in the framework of the Pre-accession Assistance 
and European Neighborhood instruments, the bloc financially supports their 
advancement of democracy and rule of law, public administration, justice and 
social sector reforms, empowerment of small and medium-sized enterprises and 
civil society organizations, etc. It is worth noting that, though Nye considers 
payments to generally represent a form a hard power, he argues in favor of 
contextual understanding of soft power resources, acknowledging that “resources 
often associated with hard power behavior can also produce soft power behavior 
depending on the context and how they are used” (Nye, 2011 p. 21). Given the 
context of the EU’s financial assistance, I argue that it can be fairly deemed 
not as simply a payment for loyalty, but a form of true benignity, soft power. 
First, the EU tends to provide material assistance not only to loyal states, but 
even to a number of self-confessedly unamicable regimes: to illustrate, the 
EaP’s beneficiaries include autocratic Azerbaijan and Belarus and even Russia 
was offered membership in the program, but rejected it. Also, the bloc has 
kept financing its projects in Armenia even after its President Serj Sargsyan 
announced in September 2013 that Armenia would enter the EAEU instead of 
signing an EU Association Agreement (Kostanyan & Giragosian, 2016). To 
draw a parallel, Russia in a similar case replied by annexing Crimea and arming 
rebels in Donbas after Ukraine had opted for the EU and not the EAEU. Second, 
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the EU is sometimes noted for not substantially accentuating financial support 
in its public diplomacy, due to which it tends to remain unnoticed: as a result, in 
2014, 47% of Serbians reportedly believed that Russia was the largest supplier 
of aid to their country, although in reality, 89.49% of foreign aid to Serbia was 
coming from the EU and the US (Szpala, 2014, p. 3).
Despite the aforementioned fears that internal crises in the EU make its 
rapprochement with the target countries less topical, distracting the bloc’s 
attention and resources from them, facts prove the opposite. Figures given 
in Tables 2 and 3 clearly show that the EU has been increasing its financial 
assistance to them and is planning to increase more. Furthermore, the bloc 
seems to be paying increasingly more attention to the development of the target 
countries, the state of their reforms and implementation of EU requirements, 
trying to enhance the effectiveness of EU funds there. With this aim in view, 
the bloc’s assistance to its candidate countries in 2014–2020, compared to the 
period of 2007–2013, provides for “a stronger ownership by the beneficiaries 
through integrating their own reform and development agendas”, allowing “a 
move towards a more targeted assistance, ensuring efficiency, sustainability and 
focus on results” as well as “a more systematic use of sector budget support” 
(European Commission, 2016). Such principles of aid allocation sharply 
contrast with those of Russia, whose aid is known for aiming mostly to pay 
for loyalty and increase its economic leverage in the recipient state, not being 
strongly linked to how effectively the recipient state disposes of the aid and 
whether it complies with the terms of its provision. For instance, one study on 
Russia’s assistance to Belarus observed that “in reality the decisions to disburse 
the individual instalments of an ACF EurAsEC6 loan are highly politicised, 
and money has been paid out to Belarus despite its failure to fully meet the 
conditions of the loan” (Wierzbowska-Miazga, 2013, pp. 17–18).
The second aspect of the EU’s benignity consists in aiding the countries that 
fall victim to other IR actors’ hard power, contributing to their independent 
development and peaceful resolution of conflicts. To cite the most illustrative 
examples of this point, the EU supported the 1999 NATO operation aimed to 
save Kosovar Albanians from the repressions of the Milošević’s regime; later, the 
bloc has actively assisted that region in its democratic transition and, since 2008, 
independent development. More recently, the EU strongly condemned Russian 
aggressions against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, which in the latter case 
was not limited to verbal political support of and financial assistance to the victim 
6 The abbreviation stands for the Russia-controlled Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian 
Economic Community, which existed before the launch of the EAEU.
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states, but went as far as to introduce economic sanctions against Putin’s regime. 
In both cases, European leaders—Nicolas Sarkozy in 2008 and Angela Merkel 
and Francois Hollande in 2014—mediated at peace talks. And in both cases, those 
mediations achieved relative success: both the 2008 Six Points Agreement and the 
2014 Minsk Agreements managed to abate the conflicts’ active phases.
Table 2. EU Financial assistance allocated to EP members under research  
in 2007–2020, in million euros 
EP member Financial assistance 
in 2007–2010
Financial assistance 
in 2011–2013
Financial assistance 
in 2014–2020  
(indicative)
Armenia 98 157 741–906
Georgia 120 180 610–746
Moldova 210 273 610–746
Ukraine 494 470 828–1,013
Source: Rieker, 2016, p. 193
Table 3. Financial assistance allocated to EU candidate countries under research  
in 2007–2020
EU Candidate Financial assistance under 
IPA I (2007–2013)
Financial assistance under 
IPA II (2014–2020)
Albania 591.2 649.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina 610.1 165.87
Kosovo 635.3 645.5
Macedonia 615.1 664.2
Montenegro 235.6 270.5
Serbia 1,385.4 1,508.0
Source: European Commission, 20167
Yet, this dimension of EU benignity suffers from weaknesses. To give a few 
examples, even though both Georgia and Ukraine appreciated the EU’s support 
7 For Bosnia, the EU limited financial assistance under IPA II to 2014–2017 because 
of the country’s insufficient progress in the process of EU integration and the lack of 
national strategies in a number of sectors (European Commission, 2014).
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in the face of Russian actions, both found the taken measures insufficient, 
belated and indecisive (see Getmanchuk, 2014; Khidasheli, 2011, pp. 100–102). 
Armenia’s decision to join the EAEU instead of signing an EU Association 
Agreement, for which the country had been prepared for four years, partially 
came due to the fact that Erevan regarded the EU to be unable (unlike Russia) 
to provide military support to Armenia in case of Azerbaijan’s aggression 
(Vasilyan, 2017, pp. 33–34). Yet, the peculiarity of this aspect of attractiveness 
is that it presupposes that the bloc’s soft power for the target countries hinges on 
its ability to use hard power against aggressive actors. However, this has hardly 
anything to do with the crises under analysis; rather, it is the EU’s systematic 
weakness that was manifesting itself even in the 1990s–2000s, when its soft 
power was on its peak. Different explanations attribute this weakness to the 
bloc’s shortage of military power, lack of coherence, will and strategic skills 
to use the power resources it possesses, insufficient social power grounded on 
shared concepts and perceptions of power (Forsberg, 2013, pp. 36–37). Against 
this backdrop, it seems an accomplishment that despite a rise of far-right and far-
left parties, the European Parliament has adopted numerous resolutions strongly 
condemning Russian aggressions and, despite a growing number of populist 
regimes empathetic with Russian foreign policy, the European Council still 
managed to introduce, expand and prolong economic sanctions against Russia.
3. Conclusions
Twenty-eight years ago, Joseph Nye coined the concept of soft power while 
working on a book which aimed to challenge the then widespread idea about 
a decline in US power (Nye 2015, p. ix). This article is my humble attempt to 
employ this concept to pursue a similar objective, but in relation to the EU. The 
discussion above allows concluding that a decline in EU soft power seems to be 
stronger perceived inside the EU, where a series of crises, which has enjoyed 
considerable attention from the media, politicians and ordinary EU citizens, 
tends to engender an overall impression that EU soft power is going into decay. 
Yet, deemed from the perspective of Western Balkan and EaP states, which 
compare EU soft power assets with their own ones and those of EU competitors, 
the bloc’s attractiveness has hardly decreased enough for them to revise their EU 
aspirations. Hence, the nowadays popular conventional wisdom that soon the EU 
is likely to no longer be an attractive power to align to seems, to a large extent, 
engendered by an amalgamation of relative and absolute perspectives on soft 
power. It does not appear, however, to be the only factor to generate this wisdom. 
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What seems to also inflame the pessimism about the bloc’s attractiveness is the 
fact that the EU, to date, is the world’s most successful integration group and is 
often viewed as a model for regional integration (e.g., Lenz, 2012). Such a high 
status generates high, sometimes fairly excessive expectations from the bloc, 
especially in its external affairs (on the EU’s capability–expectations gap see 
Hill, 1993) and as a result, any EU failure turns out be more notable than similar 
failures of other integration groups.
All in all, it hardly appears fair to speak of “the end of European soft power”, 
like some analysts do (e.g., Sommerfeldt & Zschäpitz, 2016). Rather, constantly 
changing domestic and international contexts keep bringing different aspects of 
the EU’s attractiveness to the fore, giving importance to different competitive 
advantages of the bloc. In light of this, it is no surprise that nowadays, in the 
post-Brexit period, the vast majority of the target countries are keeping their 
European choice as their foreign policy priorities: as the then Serbian Prime 
Minister Aleksandar Vučić said in February 2016, the EU may have “lost its 
magic power” and “is not as attractive as it used to be, but we are rational people 
and we know this is the best for our country” (RFE/RL, 2016). 
Concurrently, the fact that internal EU crises do not substantially affect its 
attractiveness in its neighborhood does not imply that neither do external 
factors. Illustrative of this point are two “outliers”, that is, two countries that 
have got off the European way in recent years. As was mentioned above, the 
first factor, which turned Armenia away from the European path, is the EU’s 
general weakness in the security field and inability to cope with other countries’ 
hard power. The second factor is that the bloc tends to be flippant regarding 
who to rely on in the target countries, sometimes supporting politicians whose 
policies appear blatantly inconsistent with European values, which in the end 
undermines the EU’s reputation. A vivid example of this point is Moldova, 
where the election of a pro-Russian President in November 2016 was mainly 
due to a popular disenchantment not with the EU itself, but unprecedentedly 
high corruption among the EU-oriented coalition which has governed the 
country since 2009 (e.g., Kostanyan, 2016). Remarkably, the EU’s officials used 
to constantly support the coalition, calling the country under their governance “a 
success story”, which in the end considerably lowered popular trust in the bloc 
in that country (Kostanyan, 2016).
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